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CONTINGENCY FEES: VICTIM OR CONTRIBUTING CAUSE
OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM ACTS?
Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc.
37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1985)
JANE E. REAMES*
Medical malpractice has always been a sensitive area of litigation
because the claims allege that health care providers failed to meet the
standards of their chosen profession. With patients expecting more and
better results from modem medicine, and with the breakdown of the
family doctor-patient relationship, patients were more disposed toward
suing doctors for perceived malpractice.' As insurance premiums rose to
match burgeoning claims, the medical community reacted. Doctors did
not question the validity of the increases, but instead lashed out at the
legal profession. 2 They lobbied state legislatures for medical reform;
3
their goal: to reduce premiums and frivolous lawsuits. All fifty states
have various forms of medical malpractice acts.4 The acts generally pro-
* B.B.A., Finance, Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 1986; J.D., I1T Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1987.
1. For information concerning the various causes of increased medical malpractice claims see
Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective, 1976 INs. L.J. 90, originally
printed in 3 WEST. ST. L. REV. 27 (1975); Carpenter, The Patient's Compensation Board: An Answer
to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 3 WEST. ST. L. REV. 15 (1975); Comment, Medical Malpractice:
A Sojourn through the Jurisprudence Addressing Limitation of Liability, 30 Loy. L. REV. 119 (1984);
and Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TULANE L. REV. 655
(1976). See also U.S. News & World Reports, Jan. 20, 1975, at 53; Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1983, sec. 2
at 1, col. 1; and Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1974, at 1, col. 6 (Eastern ed.). For an extensive analysis of the
frequency of claims see Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 27 J.L.
& EcON. 115 (1984).
2. See Aitken, supra note 1, at 91; Flemma, Medical Malpractice: A Dilemma in the Search for
Justice, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 237 (1985).
3. Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid
Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 143 (1981); Sohn, An
Examination of Alternatives to Suit in Doctor-Patient Disputes, 48 ALB. L. REV. 669 (1984); see also
Aitken, supra note 1.
4. For analyses of state legislative efforts, see Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law
of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts about the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV.
939 (1984); Byrd, The North Carolina Medical Malpractice Statute, 62 N.C.L. REV. 711 (1984);
Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act-A Survey and Analysis of its
History, Construction and Constitutionality, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265 (1984); MacAlister and Scan-
lan, Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland: The Experiment Has Failed, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 481
(1985); Note, Civil Procedure-Constitutional Law-Access to the Courts and the Medical Malprac-
tice Act, 14 N.M.L. REV. 503 (1984); Note, Medical Malpractice Legislation: The Kansas Response
to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 566 (1984); Note, Ohio's Attempts to Halt the
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vide for: (1) notice before suit; (2) a medical review panel; (3) qualifica-
tions for experts; (4) limitations on recovery for non-economic damages;
(5) provisions for periodic payments in excess of a specified dollar
amount; and (6) limitations on contingency fees. This comment focuses
on the recent California Supreme Court case, Roa v. Lodi Medical Group,
Inc.,5 which upheld the constitutionality of a limitation on contingency
fees. The United States Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's appeal for
lack of a substantial federal question.
6
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
As states passed medical malpractice legislation,7 courts subse-
Medical Malpractice Crisis: Effective or Meaningless?, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 361 (1984); Comment,
Medical Malpractice Legislation: Rx for Utah, II J. CONTEMP. L. 287 (1984); Comment, Recent
Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TULANE L. REV. 655 (1976) and Comment,
An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417.
5. Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 421.
6. 106 S. Ct. 421 (1985).
7. The medical malpractice "crisis" in California began as long ago as 1957. (Some commen-
tators suggest that there was no such crisis in any state. Spence and Roth, Closing the Courthouse
Door: Florida's Spurious Claims Statute, 11 STETSON L. REV. 283, 284-85 (1982); Cunningham &
Lane, Malpractice- The Illusory Crisis, 54 FLA. B.J. 114 (1980); Sepler, Professional Malpractice
Litigation Crisis: Danger or Distortion? 15 FORUM 493 (1980); Scherero, Legislative Responses to the
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 5 J. L. & MED. 175, 176 n.2 (1979).) From that time to about 1974, the
insurance industry failed to charge doctors premiums high enough to allow sufficient reserves to
meet future claims. When the number of malpractice claims and the dollar amount of judgments
began to surge, by 1975 insurers were paying out $180 for each $100 collected in premiums. Insur-
ance companies either abandoned the market or raised premiums by several hundred percent. See
Keene, California's Medical Malpractice Crisis, A Legislator's Guide to the Medical Malpractice Issue
(Georgetown U. & Nat. Conf. of State Legs. 1976) at 27. Being unable to pass on the costs of
skyrocketing premiums, doctors went on strike, and in certain areas of California, medical care came
to a virtual halt. Id.
California Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. responded by convening the legislature in an ex-
traordinary session. See American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga,
33 Cal. 3d 674, 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983) (As the first case addressing the constitu-
tionality of MICRA, American Bank contains a great deal of legislative background.) The Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) resulted. Stats. 1975, Second Ex. Sess. 1975-76, ch. 1,
p. 3949, et seq. MICRA enacted reforms in three basic areas: (1) medical quality assurance,
(2) medical malpractice insurance, and (3) medical malpractice litigation. Medical quality assurance
restructured the means for the licensure, regulation, education, and discipline of health care provid-
ers. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2000-2202, 2220-2319, and 2320-2336 (1979). Under the
medical malpractice insurance reform, a health care provider could demand explanation, and even
obtain a public hearing, requiring the insurer to justify substantial rate increases. CAL. INS. CODE
§§ 11587, 11588 (1979).
The primary purpose of MICRA was to reduce medical malpractice insurance costs. It affected
four basic areas: (1) statutes of limitation, (CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 340.5; §§ 364, 365 (1979)
require 90-day notice before filing suit); (2) damages, (CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (1979) limits non-
economic losses to $250,000); (3) attorney's fees, (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (1979)); and
(4) arbitration (CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1295 (1979) prescribes language for arbitration clauses in
contracts for medical services). This article focuses on that provision which limits contingency fees.
Section 6146 was included to help reduce medical malpractice insurance premiums by structuring a
"sliding scale" fee schedule.
CONTINGENCY FEES
quently addressed their constitutionality. Most of the cases to date focus
on the constitutionality of arbitration or review panels.8  In 1980, two
cases were decided: one in New Hampshire9 and one in Indiana.I° The
New Hampshire court invalidated the limitation on attorney fees as un-
constitutional. The Indiana court, however, upheld its constitutionality.
The reason for these opposite results is readily explained from the provi-
sions in their respective medical malpractice legislation.
In Carson v. Maurer,"l six different cases were consolidated on ap-
peal. All involved actions for medical injury, and all challenged the con-
stitutionality of RSA ch. 507-C (Supp. 1979). Among other provisions,
the legislation established a contingency fee scale for attorneys in medical
malpractice actions. '
2
8. DiFilippo v. Beck, 520 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1981) (referral of claims to panel and subse-
quent admission of panel's opinion at trial comport with equal protection, due process, and jury trial
guarantee); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (review panel does not violate
right to trial by jury, nor does it invade the judicial function); Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp.
Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (medical review panel was unconstitutional because it
delegated judicial functions to nonjudicial personnel and impermissibly restricted the right of trial by
jury). It should also be noted that since the Wright decision, the Illinois legislature passed a new
medical malpractice act effective August 15, 1985, under House Bill 1604. A trial court held the
1985 Act unconstitutional and the matter is pending before the Illinois Supreme Court under Ber-
nier v. Burrs, Docket No. 62876. Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978) (upheld panel
review required before filing suit); Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 447 A.2d 860 (1982) (medical
injury arose before effective date of legislation and thus arbitration not required before filing suit);
Attorney General of Md. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S.
805 (submission to nonbinding arbitration before filing suit does not violate separation of powers or
right to trial by jury, nor significantly interfere with any fundamental right); Morris v. Metriyakool,
418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner,
583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (unconstitutional because it violates individual's right of access
to courts); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977) (before treatment patient
may file election not to come within provisions of statute, which required, inter alia submission of
claim to medical review panel); Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425, 659 P.2d 311 (1983) (violates due
process and access to courts); Treyball v. Clark, 65 N.Y.2d 589, 483 N.E.2d 1136 (1985) (panels'
recommendations are admissible, but not binding on trier-of-fact, at trial; the recommendations will
assist rather than supplant the trier-of-fact in reaching a verdict; jury remains the final arbiter of
questions of fact; panel recommendations will also better equip the parties to mediate a settlement);
Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980) (arbitration requirement declared unconsti-
tutional due to impermissible delays in processing claims under procedures prescribed in Act);
Mortenson v. Miller, 99 Wis. 2d 209, 298 N.W.2d 546 (1980) (filing with panel tolled statute of
limitations for filing of lawsuit). See also Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 583 (1977) and Comment, The Con-
stitutional Considerations of Medical Malpractice Screening Panels, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 161, 161 n.2
(1977). There is a question whether these panels are accomplishing their purpose. See, e.g.,
Bedihian, Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act: Michigan's Experience with Arbitration, 10 AM. J.L.
& MED. 287 (1984); and Note, A Practical Assessment of Arizona's Medical Malpractice Screening
System, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 335 (1984).
9. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980). See also Annot., 12 A.L.R.4th 1
(1982).
10. Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
11. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
12. In enacting the statute, the New Hampshire legislature found:
that substantial increases in the incidence and size of claims for medical injury pose a
major threat to effective delivery of medical care in the state and that the risks and conse-
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The issue in Carson was whether the medical malpractice statute
violated equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. In determin-
ing which judicial standard to apply, the court found that although the
statute established several classes, 13 none involved a suspect class, such
as race, alienage or nationality, which would require strict scrutiny.
14
On the other hand, the court found that the right to recover for personal
injuries was sufficiently important to require a more rigorous judicial
scrutiny than allowed under the rational basis test.15 By applying an in-
termediate test, 16 Carson held the statute unconstitutional because it
(1) denied medical malpractice victims equal protection of the law and
(2) unreasonably discriminated in favor of health care defendants and
unduly burdened seriously injured malpractice plaintiffs. 17
quences of medical injury must be stabilized in order to encourage continued provisions of
medical care to the public at reasonable cost, the continued existence of medical care insti-
tutions and the continued readiness of individuals to enter the medical care field.
Id. at 930, 424 A.2d at 829-30. (Emphasis added). Exactly what did the legislature mean by "stabi-
lize" the risks and consequences of medical injury? Must a state legislature reduce the risks and
consequences of a medical care provider's negligence to ensure the availability of medical care to the
public? Whether health care costs increase or potential recovery is reduced, the public bears the
burden. Perhaps such legislation constitutes "surgery," when the patient could have been cured with
aspirin. See Attorney General of Md. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978).
13. The classes are: (1) tortfeasors who are health care providers receive benefits not afforded
to other tortfeasors; (2) tort claimants injured by medical malpractice are distinguished from other
tort claimants; (3) medical malpractice victims whose non-economic loss exceeds $250,000 are dis-
tinguished from medical malpractice victims whose non-economic loss is $250,000 or less; and
(4) medical malpractice victims whose future damage awards exceed $50,000 are distinguished from
those who are awarded $50,000 or less for future damages. Carson, 120 N.H. at 931, 424 A.2d at
830.
14. Id. Courts apply strict strutiny as the standard for judicial review when legislation burdens
fundamental rights or suggests prejudice against racial or other minorities. This standard subjects
legislation to closer analysis in order to preserve substantial values of equality and autonomy. L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 1000, 1012 (1978).
15. Carson, 120 N.H.2d at 931, 424 A.2d at 830. Under the rational basis test, the court merely
determines whether the statute enacted by the legislature is rationally related to the legislative pur-
pose. This standard accords much deference to the legislature. See generally, Tussman & ten-
Broeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
With respect to equal protection, rational basis requires some rationality in the nature of the
classes singled out, with "rationality" tested by the classification's ability to serve the purposes in-
tended by the legislature. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-309 (1966). The courts also deter-
mine whether the classifications created by a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW at 994-1000 (1978).
16. Courts apply an intermediate test when, although strict scrutiny is not required, rational
basis may not be a sufficient standard. The intermediate test is applied in equal protection analysis
when the court addresses a gender-based classification. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
For information concerning other circumstances which trigger intermediate review, see L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 1082-89 (1978). For discussion of the intermediate standard
as applied to medical malpractice legislation, see Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act. An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 So. CAL. L. REV. 829 (1979) and Spence and Roth,
supra note 7.
17. Carson, 120 N.H. at 944, 424 A.2d at 838.
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Under intermediate judicial scrutiny, Carson also held the limitation
on attorney fees unconstitutional.' 8 The court reasoned that because
there was no direct evidence that juries consider attorney fees in reaching
a verdict,' 9 reapportionment of jury awards would not significantly affect
the size of such awards. Thus, reducing attorney fees would do little to
reduce medical malpractice insurance premiums or control health care
costs. In addition, the court found that by reducing attorney fees solely
in the area of medical malpractice, such cases would become less attrac-
tive to the plaintiffs bar. Consequently, the statute would deter litigation
of legitimate causes of action, thereby creating a potential impediment to
a victim's access to courts and counsel.
20
Finally, the court held that the statute unjustly discriminated be-
cause it interferes with the freedom of contract between a single class of
plaintiffs and their attorneys. The court reasoned that not only did the
statute fail to regulate contingency fees in all tort actions, it did not even
apply to defense counsel in medical malpractice cases. 21 Only plaintiffs
in medical malpractice cases were limited as to what amount they could
pay their attorneys. Thus, the court held this provision unconstitutional.
An issue not raised in Carson was the separation of powers argu-
ment. This issue was raised in Heller v. Frankston,22 although the plain-
tiffs also raised the issues of due process and equal protection. Of
primary importance to the Heller court was the question of the interplay
between the legislative and judicial branches in regulating various aspects
of attorney conduct. 23 Pennsylvania appears to have strong precedent
that the judiciary exclusively regulates attorney conduct,24 which in-
18. The court summarized the legislature's purpose in enacting the limitation on attorney fees:
The purpose of this provision is to assure that the malpractice victim receives the bulk of
any award, thereby increasing the cost effectiveness of awards to plaintiffs and of the medi-
cal reparations system as a whole. Id. at 945, 424 A.2d at 839.
19. One study shows that juries do not consider the lawyer's contingency fee in any award of
damages. Note, supra note 16, at 943.
20. Carson, 120 N.H. at 944, 424 A.2d at 839. See also Note, supra note 16, at 944.
21. Carson, 120 N.H. at 945, 424 A.2d at 839.
22. 76 Pa. Commw. 294, 464 A.2d 581 (1983), afrd, 504 Pa. 528, 475 A.2d 1292 (1984).
23. Id. at 299-300, 464 A.2d at 584.
24. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has the exclusive and inherent power to regulate the
conduct of attorneys. Ballou v. State Ethics Comm'n, 56 Pa. Commw. 240, 424 A.2d 983 (1981),
modified on appeal, 496 Pa. 127, 436 A.2d 186. In addition to prescribing general rules for admis-
sion to and regulation of the bar, the power of the Supreme Court includes the continuous monitor-
ing of the practice of law. Cantor v. Supreme Court of Pa., 353 F. Supp. 1307, 1316 n.21 (E.D. Pa.
1973), affid. 487 F.2d 1391. To the extent that legislation governs the admission, professional con-
duct and discipline of lawyers, it encroaches upon the power of the judiciary. In re Splane, 123 Pa.
527, 16 A. 481 (1889). Such encroachments are viewed as vain attempts by the legislature to exercise
a power which it does not possess. Hoopes v. Bradshaw, 231 Pa. 485, 487, 80 A. 1098, 1099 (1911).
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cludes fees charged by lawyers. 25 Because the Pennsylvania courts have
exclusive power and authority to examine and approve those fees, such
power and authority cannot be usurped the the legislature.26 Under this
separation of powers analysis, the Pennsylvania court held the limitation
of attorney fees in medical malpractice cases unconstitutional.
Other jurisdictions uphold the constitutionality of limitations on
contingency fees in medical malpractice cases 27 and even in all negligence
cases.28 Essentially, these courts hold that the legislation enjoyed a pre-
sumption of constitutionality, which presumption its challengers failed to
overcome. In Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hospital, Inc. ,29 the Indiana court
held that neither a fundamental right nor suspect classification was in-
volved. Therefore, the applicable standard of review is that the classifica-
tion not be arbitrary or oppressive or unreasonable, and that a fair and
substantial relationship exist between the classification and the purpose
of the legislation creating it.30 The court found that the limitation on
attorney fees is a rational means31 to achieve the legislative goal of
preventing attorneys from receiving inordinantly large fees under contin-
gency agreements.
32
In Indiana, physicians may voluntarily qualify to come under the
provisions of the Act. If they do, the Act limits their liability to $100,000
and the patient's recovery to $500,000. The remaining $400,000 liability
is paid from a patient's compensation fund. The Act only limits attorney
fees paid out of that fund. It does not at all affect the amount of fees
which may be paid out of the first $100,000 recovery, as that amount is
not paid from the compensation fund. 33 In addition, a patient may elect
to pay attorney fees on a per diem basis, but such election must be exer-
cised in written form at the time of employment. 34 Under this scenario,
the court held the limitation constitutional.
25. Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111;
Breckenridge v. McFarland, Addison Reporter 49 (1793).
26. The court distinguished statutes which limit attorney fees in worker's compensation claims,
actions relating to unemployment compensation, and losses or injuries due to crime as being reme-
dies created by the legislature and not previously existing at common law, as medical malpractice.
Heller v. Frankston, 76 Pa. Commw. at 304, 464 A.2d at 586-87.
27. Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985);
Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
28. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350
(1974), which essentially adopted the appellate court opinion found at 126 N.J. Super. 577 (1974).
29. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
30. Id. at 397, 404 N.E.2d at 600.
31. Id. at 394, 404 N.E.2d at 598.
32. Id. at 401, 404 N.E.2d at 602.
33. Id. at 402, 404 N.E.2d at 603.
34. Id. at 401, 404 N.E.2d at 602.
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Unlike cases limited to medical malpractice, American Trial Law-
yers Association v. New Jersey Supreme Court,35 upheld a limitation
which applies to all negligence cases. American Trial Lawyers is cited as
persuasive authority by courts which upheld the constitutionality of lim-
iting contingency fees. Yet, unlike cases limited to medical malpractice,
American Trial Lawyers upheld a limitation which applied to all negli-
gence cases. Moreover, the limitation was not enacted by the legislature,
but was adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Contingency fees had been of concern to the New Jersey Supreme
Court for some fifteen years before the rule was adopted. In the summer
of 1971, the court published a proposed rule and held a public hearing on
November 6, 1971. After considering objections, both oral and written,
from bar associations at the hearing, the New Jersey Supreme Court
amended the rule and adopted it on December 21, 1971.36 The rule
37
provides for contingency fees as follows:
1. 50% on the first $1,000 recovered;
2. 40% on the next $2,000 recovered;
3. 331/3% on the next $47,000 recovered;
4. 20% on the next $50,000 recovered;
5. 10% on any amount recovered over $100,000; and
6. Where the amount recovered is for the benefit of an infant or in-
35. 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974).
36. American Trial lawyers Ass'n, 126 N.J. Super. at 580, 316 A.2d at 21.
37. Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, Rule 1:21-7 (West 1971). A com-
parison of the New Jersey contingency fee scale to other jurisdictions is as follows:
New Jersey (as adopted in 1971)
1st $ 1,000.00 = 50%
2nd 2,000.00 = 40%
next 47,000.00 = 33-1/3%
next 50,000.00 = 20%
+ 100,000.00 = 10%
Illinois
1st $ 150,000.00 = 33-1/3%
next 850,000.00 = 25%










New Jersey (as adopted in 1984)
1st $ 250,000.00 = 33-1/3%
2nd 250,000.00 = 25%
+ 500,000.00 = 20%
Pennsylvania
1st $ 100,000.00 = 30%
2nd 100,000.00 = 25%
+ 200,000.00 = 20%
(held unconstitutional by Heller v. Frankston, 76
Pa. Commw. 294, 464 A.d 581 (1983), aff'd on
other grounds, 504 Pa. 528, 475 A.2d 1292
(1984)).
Michigan
1st $ 5,000.00 = 40%
next 20,000.00 = 35%
next 225,000.00 = 25%
next 225,000.00 = 20%
+ 500,000.00 = 10%
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competent and the matter is settled without trial the foregoing lim-
its apply, except that the fee on any amount recovered up to
$50,000 shall not exceed 25%.
The fee is computed after deducting disbursements made in connection
with prosecution of the claim. The permissible fee also includes legal
services rendered on any re-trial, appeal or review. 38 In the event that
attorneys feel the fee is inadequate for the services rendered, the rule
gives the trial judge discretion to determine whether the fee is reasonable
in light of all the circumstances.
39
In American Trial Lawyers, the trial court held the rule invalid on
state constitutional grounds. It noted that before adoption of the rule,
the 331/3 contingency fee was prevalent in New Jersey and elsewhere.
The rule not only interfered with the freedom of contract, but it re-
stricted attorneys' incomes without support in the record or in matters
subject to judicial notice.4° In reversing, the appellate court held that the
trial court improperly placed the burden on the defendant. 41 Instead, the
New Jersey Supreme Court rule was presumed to be constitutional.
42
Because plaintiffs failed to submit financial and other data showing that
the rule was unfair, the trial court was required to presumed the rule was
valid.
4 3
FACTS OF THE CASE
In a 4-3 decision, with Chief Justice Bird strongly dissenting, the
California Supreme Court narrowly upheld the constitutionality of sec-
tion 614644 of the California Business and Professions Code, which limits
38. Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, Rule 1:21-7(d) (West 1971).
39. Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, Rule 1:21-7(0 (West 1971).
40. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n, at 580, 316 A.2d at 21.
41. Id. at 586, 316 A.2d at 26-27.
42. Id. at 583, 316 A.2d at 26.
43. Id.
44. Section 6146 provides in relevant part:
(a) An attorney shall not contract for or collect a contingency fee for representing any
person seeking damages in connection with an action for injury or damage against a health
care provider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence in excess of the
following limits:
(1) Forty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(2) Thirty-three and one-third percent of the next fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)
recovered.
(3) Twenty-five percent of the next one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) recov-
ered.
(4) Ten percent of any amount on which the recovery exceeds two hundred thou-
sand dollars ($200,000).
The limitations shall apply regards of whether the recovery is by settlement, arbitration, or
judgment, or whether the person for whom the recovery is made is a responsible adult, an
infant, or a person of unsound mind.
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the amount of a contingency fee in a medical malpractice claim.45 Frank
and Yvonne Roa sued on behalf of themselves and as guardian ad litem
for their infant son, Frank Joseph Roa. During their child's birth, the
defendants failed to perform the requisite Caesarean section when they
knew or should have known that the baby was in danger. Due to a lack
of oxygen, their baby suffered permanent brain damage.
After much discovery, plaintiffs negotiated a settlement with two
defendants: Lodi Medical Group, Inc. and Dr. Roget. The settlement
provided that $495,000 be apportioned to the minor and that $5,000 be
paid to the parents. 46 The plaintiffs requested court approval for the pay-
ment of attorney fees. The parents informed the court that they knew
that section 6146 limited attorney fees to about $90,800. They explained,
however, that under the contingency fee agreement, they believed their
attorneys were entitled to 25% of the minor's net recovery-about
$122,800. In support of this request, their attorneys filed points and au-
thorities that section 6146 was unconstitutional because it violated the
first amendment, due process, equal protection, and the separation of
powers.
47
The trial court found that plaintiffs and their attorneys had entered
into an agreement providing for attorney fees of 25% of any net recov-
ery. It also found that the requested $122,800 in fees was a fair and
reasonable amount for attorney fees in this case and was in no way dis-
proportionate to the quality or quantity of the legal services rendered.
The court noted that were it not for section 6146, it would award the
amount of fees requested. However, the court rejected the constitutional
challenges to section 6146 and approved fees of only $90,800-the statu-
tory limitation.4  Plaintiffs appealed 49 to the California Appellate5° and
(c) For purposes of this section:
(1) 'Recovered' means the net sum recovered after deducting any disbursements or
costs incurred in connection with prosecution or settlement of the claim. Costs of medical
care incurred by the plaintiff and the attorney's office-overhead costs or charges are not
deductible disbursements or costs for such purpose.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (1979).
45. Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 421.
46. Id. at 924, 695 P.2d at 165, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
47. Id. at 925, 927 n.5, 936, 695 P.2d at 166, 167-68 n.5, 174, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79, 80-81 n.5,
87.
48. Id. at 925, 695 P.2d at 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
49. Amicus briefs were filed on behalf of both sides. One brief questioned whether the plaintiffs
could even properly prosecute the.appeal. Since the order provided that more of the settlement than
requested be preserved for the minor, plaintiffs had not been aggrieved. The court noted, however,
that one of plaintiffs' contentions was that section 6146 is invalid because it impinged on the right of
medical malpractice plaintiffs to retain competent counsel. Plaintiffs argued that if the statutory
limits are enforced, their attorneys will have little incentive to pursue additional recovery against the
remaining defendants. The court concluded that plaintiffs could pursue this substantive argument
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Supreme 51 Courts, reasserting their constitutional challenges.
THE MAJORITY'S REASONING
The California Supreme Court rejected one-by-one all of plaintiffs'
constitutional challenges. The majority responded to plaintiffs' first
amendment argument in a footnote. 52 Although the court deemed the
argument as creative, 53 it rejected any attempt to invoke strict judicial
scrutiny, since it would preclude a state from imposing any limitations on
attorney fees. 54 The majority went on to contrast limitations on contin-
gency fees to the complete prohibition of contingency fees to political
lobbyists. 55 The court reasoned that section 6146 is constitutional be-
cause it does not completely prohibit plaintiffs from retaining attorneys
on a contingency basis; it merely limits the percentage paid to the
attorney.
56
In another brief section, the majority rejected plaintiffs' separation
of powers argument. Plaintiffs' contended that in light of the court's in-
herent power to review attorney fee contracts, the question of the appro-
priateness of attorney fees is a matter solely committed to the judiciary.
57
The majority held that section 6146 did not violate the separation of
powers doctrine because legislature has imposed fee limitations in the
past and applicable California authority expressly refutes plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the legislature has no power to so act.
58
The majority next rejected plaintiffs' due process claim. It reasoned
that section 6146 does not abrogate the right of medical malpractice vic-
tims to retain counsel, but simply limits the compensation an attorney
may receive under a contingency fee agreement. 59 The court noted that
statutory limitations on attorney fees are not uncommon in California, 6°
on appeal. It also noted that since numerous amicus briefs had been filed on both sides, the compet-
ing viewpoints were adequately represented. Finally, the court stated in passing that it was not
deciding whether there was a potential conflict of interest between plaintiffs and their attorneys on
the attorney fee question, requiring separate representation of their interests. Id. at 925 n.4, 695
P.2d at 166 n.4, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79 n.4.
50. 129 Cal. App. 3d 318, 181 Cal. Rptr. 44 (3rd Dist. 1982).
51. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985).
52. Id. at 927-28 n.5, 695 P.2d at 167-68 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81 n.5.
53. Id. at 927 n.5, 695 P.2d at 167 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81 n.5.
54. Id. at 927-28 n.5, 695 P.2d at 167-68 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81 n.5.
55. Id. at 928 n.5, 695 P.2d at 168 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81 n.5.
56. Id. at 926, 927 n.5, 695 P.2d at 166, 168 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79 81 n.5.
57. Id. at 933, 695 P.2d at 172, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 926, 695 P.2d at 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
60. E.g., workers' compensation proceedings (CAL. LAB. CODE § 4906 (1979)) and probate
matters (CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 901, 910 (1979)).
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or other states, 6t and have even been legislated by Congress. 62 Moreover,
the validity of such legislation has been upheld by the United States
Supreme Court.63 The court concluded that legislative ceilings on attor-
ney fees were not constitutionally suspect and thus not subject to strict
judicial scrutiny. 64
Having rejected strict judicial scrutiny,65 the court applied the lesser
standard of rational basis.66 Under this standard, the court also rejected
plaintiffs' due process argument that section 6146 was invalid because the
fees permitted were so low that in practice the statute would make it
impossible for injured persons to find an attorney to represent them.67
The court viewed the adequacy of fees as an empirical matter, and plain-
tiffs did not produce any data or other evidence showing that malpractice
victims would be unable to retain counsel. The court also noted that fees
under the California statute were generous compared to the New Jersey
statute, which provided something of a model for section 6146.68 The
sliding scale schedule also did not impinge on a malpractice victim's
right to counsel, nor create a conflict of interest between attorney and
client. First, the court reasoned that conflicts are inherent in all contin-
gency fee arrangements. Second, the decreasing sliding-scale approach is
recommended as the preferable form of regulation. 69 Thus, the legisla-
61. Statutory limits on all personal injury contingency fee agreements: see, e.g., American Trial
Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974); Gair v. Peck, 6
N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374
(1960); limits on only malpractice claims: see, e.g., Donaghy v. Napoleon, 543 F. Supp. 112 (D.N.J.
1982) (10% maximum under statute held inadequate to compensate attorney and court increased fee
to 20% under provision of rule permitting same); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374,
402, 404 N.E.2d 585, 602-03 (1980) (limit applies only to monies paid from Indiana's patient com-
pensation fund); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); but see Carson v.
Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (held unconstitutional because statute interferes with
right to contract and unjustly discriminates by failing to regulate defense counsel fees which con-
sume approximately same percentage of insurance premium dollar as do plaintiff attorney fees);
Heller v. Frankso, 76 Pa. Commw. 294, 303 n.12, 464 A.2d 581, 586 n.12 (1983) (held unconstitu-
tional because statute interferes with another co-equal branch of government, i.e., the judiciary).
62. E.g., Limits on attorney fees under the Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1983);
under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1983); and under the Veterans Benefit Act, 38
U.S.C. § 3404 (1983). See also Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 411 (1961).
63. Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170 (1920) (contingency fee limited to 20% of recovery against
the United States for claims arising out of the Civil War).
64. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 927, 695 P.2d at 167, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
65. The majority did not expressly address the question of whether a suspect class was in-
volved. Rather, it refused to apply strict judicial scrutiny claiming an absence of a first amendment
interest. The dissent, however, found a suspect class on the basis of wealth and, therefore, did apply
strict scrutiny.
66. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 930-31, 695 P.2d at 170-71, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83-84.
67. Id. at 928, 695 P.2d at 168, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
68. Id. at 928 n.6, 695 P.2d at 168 n.6, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81 n.6.
69. Id. at 929, 695 P.2d at 169, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 82. The majority relied on a report of an
American Bar Association commission which stated:
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ture could rationally determine that the fee schedule is an appropriate
regulation.
Finally, the court rejected out-of-hand plaintiffs' argument that sec-
tion 6146 violates due process because it applies only to medical malprac-
tice actions. The court found that it was entirely rational for the
legislature to limit the application to the medical malpractice field, since
it was trying to alleviate a "crisis" situation.70 The court also empha-
sized plaintiffs' failure to make any factual showing to support their con-
tentions. It noted that similar claims can be made against all statutes
which limit attorney fees in particular claims, and such statutes are com-
monplace. Because no authority suggested that due process required a
single, uniform attorney fee schedule for all areas of practice, the court
upheld the constitutionality of section 6146 on due process grounds.
7'
The court next addressed plaintiff's equal protection argument. The
majority did not expressly discuss whether there was a suspect class, re-
quiring strict judicial scrutiny. Rather, it appeared that they relied on
their previous rejection of the stricter standard. 7
2
Under equal protection analysis, the majority held that section 6146
is rationally related to the objectives of MICRA: to reduce medical mal-
practice insurance premiums and deter frivolous suits. First, even
though the contingency fee is paid out of the total recovery, the court
stated that plaintiffs are more likely to agree to a lower settlement be-
cause they obtain the same net recovery from that lower settlement.
Lower settlements result in lower costs to the insurance company, which,
in turn, lead to lower premiums. Second, limitations on fees deter attor-
neys from either filing frivolous suits73 or encouraging clients to hold out
for unrealistically high settlements. Third, section 6146 is rationally re-
lated to the objectives of MICRA because it attempts to preserve the
already diminished compensation 74 of the victim by protecting it from
[I]n order to relate the attorney's fee more to the amount of legal work and expense in-
volved in handling a case and less to the fortuity of the plaintiff's economic status and
degree of injury, a decreasing maximum schedule of attorney's fees, reasonably generous in
the lower recovery ranges and thus unlikely to deny potential plaintiffs access to legal
representation, should be set on a state-by-state basis.
Rep. of Com. on Medical Professional Liability, 102 ABA Annual Rep. 786, 851 (1977).
70. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 930, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
71. Id. at 929-30, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
72. Id. at 927-28 n.5, 695 P.2d at 167-68 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81 n.5.
73. Here the court seems to accuse plaintiffs of making contradictory arguments. First, plain-
tiffs argue that medical malpractice claims should not be regulated because an unusually high per-
centage of cases that are tried result in defense verdicts. But then they argue that frivolous suits are
not a real problem. Id. at 930, 695 P.2d at 170-71, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
74. MICRA is similar to other statutes which allow recovery to be reduced by collateral source
benefits (CAL. CtV. CODE § 3333.1(a) (1979) and which place limits on recovery for non-economic
losses (CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.3(b) (1979)).
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further reduction by high contingency fees.75
Finally, the court held that section 6146 does not violate equal pro-
tection even though it does not limit defense fees. The court noted that
statutes in California and other jurisdictions limit contingency fees with-
out limiting fees earned on some other basis. Moreover, the court held
that the decreasing-sliding-scale component does not discriminate
against the more seriously injured malpractice victims. 76 The court
stated that the legislature could have reasonably concluded that this ap-
proach produces more equitable fees, because it ensures that an attorney
does not receive a windfall merely because a client is seriously injured. It




Chief Justice Bird strongly dissented, joined by Justices Mosk and
McClosky. The dissent argued that section 6146 was unconstitutional
because it: (1) violates the first amendment right to petition the govern-
ment for redress and discriminates between litigants according to the
content of their views; (2) violates the due process right of medical mal-
practice victims to retain counsel and exacerbates the conflict of interest
between attorney and client; and (3) violates equal protection by arbitrar-
ily applying attorney fee limitations only in medical malpractice cases,
only to plaintiffs, and in a manner particularly burdensome to severely
injured malpractice victims with limited resources. 78
Addressing the first amendment issue, the dissent stated that the
expenditure of money for attorney fees is as essential to the exercise of
the right to petition 79 as in the expenditure of funds to pay for the use of
the electronic media by political candidates. 80 The dissent extensively
quoted Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors8 l that the
right to petition is an empty promise if individuals or others are denied
the means to meet the cost of legal representation in pursuing their right
to petition. The dissent noted that in contrast to its reliance on the 1984
75. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 932, 695 P.2d at 171, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 933, 695 P.2d at 172, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
78. Id. at 936, 695 P.2d at 174, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
79. Id. at 937, 695 P.2d at 175, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
80. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51-54 (1976).
81. 589 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1984), 105 S. Ct. 588 (probable jurisdiction noted); 105 S. Ct.
11 (government's application to stay injunction granted by Rehnquist, J.; lower court had enjoined
enforcement of 38 U.S.C. §§ 3404 and 3405 which prohibited payment of more than $10.00 by a
Veteran to an attorney); 105 S. Ct. 238 (request to vacate stay denied) (1984) rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3180
(1985).
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decision in Walters, the principal cases relied upon by the majority were
decided before 1930, and none addressed the right to petition.82
Because section 6146 regulates economic activity essential to the ef-
fective exercise of a first amendment right, the dissent applied strict scru-
tiny and compelling state interest. It first noted that the attorney fee
limitation violates the constitutional ban on content discrimination. 83
Only plaintiff contingency fees are regulated, thus affecting which views
are heard. 84 Section 6146 also facially discriminates, since it restricts fees
only paid by the person seeking damages.85 Although allowing plaintiffs
to retain a greater percentage of their recovery is a legitimate interest, the
dissent concluded that it is not a compelling one.86 It reasoned that such
a paternalistic argument is disfavored in the context of the first amend-
ment.87 Finally, the limitation on attorney fees will not accomplish the
legislative purpose of reducing medical malpractice insurance premiums,
because it merely reapportions the award between the plaintiffs and their
attorneys.
88
Under a due process analysis, the dissent found section 6146 uncon-
stitutional because it is not reasonable or proper, but is arbitrary and
oppressive. Although the statute does not completely abrogate the right
to retain counsel, it significantly interferes with that right.89 The dissent
reasoned that by lowering the attorney's compensation in a medical mal-
practice action where there is a high risk of zero recovery, many attor-
neys will cease representing malpractice victims, even victims with valid
claims. The dissent rejected the majority's comparison of section 6146 to
82. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 939, 695 P.2d at 176, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
83. There is an equality of status in the field of ideas, and government must afford all points of
view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some
groups, government may not prohibit others from assemblying or speaking on the basis of what they
intend to say. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). Accord Grayned v.
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 105-07 (1972). Any restriction on expressive activity because of its contents
would completely undercut the profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 64-65 (1976) quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See also L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 672 and nn. 1 and 2, 683, 689, 1005-06 (1978).
84. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 940, 695 P.2d at 177, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 90. The government may not
pick and choose what views may be heard. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
95-96 (1972).
85. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 940 n.9, 695 P.2d at 177 n.9, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 90 n.9. The dissent noted
that even if the statute restricted contingency fees paid by defendants, it would have no practical
effect because defendants utilize hourly per diem fee arrangements. Rather, the effect of limiting
contingency fees is to intentionally discourage use of attorney time in prosecuting medical malprac-
tice claims.
86. Id. at 940, 695 P.2d at 177, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
87. Id., citing Walters v. National Assoc. of Radiation Survivors 589 F. Supp. 1302, 1327 (N.D.
Cal. 1984).
88. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 941, 695 P.2d at 178, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
89. Id. at 942, 695 P.2d at 178, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
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other legislated fee limits. The dissent noted that where fees are regu-
lated in Workers' Compensation claims, the injured parties do not have
to prove negligence. 90 As a result, the risk of a zero recovery is substan-
tially reduced. In addition, the statute provides for "a reasonable attor-
ney's fee,"91 which allows flexibility to take into consideration the
complexity of the case and the time and effort of the attorney.
The dissent concluded that section 6146 was also arbitrary and op-
pressive. At the time MICRA was enacted, there was no evidence of an
inordinant number of frivolous claims. Nor was there evidence that such
claims contributed to the cost of medical malpractice premiums. 92 The
dissent believed that the absence of such evidence strongly suggested that
section 6146 attempted to reduce malpractice premiums by reducing the
total number of meritorious claims-exactly the sort of arbitrary and op-
pressive legislative action which due process guarantees must operate to
prevent. 9
3
The dissent also found that section 6146 violated equal protection
because it singled out and imposed a burden on only one narrow subclass
of personal injury victims. The dissent reasoned that given the high risks
and costs associated with prosecuting medical malpractice claims, attor-
neys would abandon the field for areas where the risk and costs were
lower and the compensation greater.94
Section 6146 also violated equal protection, according to the dissent,
because it created several classifications which did not bear a substantial
and rational relation to a legitimate state purpose. 95 The first class cre-
ated is that between medical malpractice victims and other tort victims.
The dissent reasoned that if the legislative purpose is to ensure that plain-
tiffs receive the bulk of the recovery, there is no rational basis to single
out medical malpractice contingency fees for special treatment. 96 The
second class created is that between plaintiff attorneys and defense attor-
neys.97 Here, the statute was underinclusive because only plaintiff fees
90. Id. at 942, 695 P.2d at 178-79, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
91. Id.
92. See Aitken, Medical Malpractice. The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective, 3 WEST ST. U. L.
REV. 27, 36 (1975); and Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50
TULANE L. REV. 655, 671 (1976).
93. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 947-48, 695 P.2d at 182, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
94. Id. at 943, 695 P.2d at 179, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
95. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972); Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506
P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
96. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 950, 695 P.2d at 184, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
97. Not only did the dissent believe that section 6146 would fail to reduce premiums, they
argued that the statute would even increase them. They reasoned that while section 6146 discouarge
attorneys from representing plaintiffs, it encouraged defense attorneys (who are paid on a per diem
basis) to undertake extensive and costly discovery prior to settlement. By so doing, defendants could
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are regulated, whereas both defendant and plaintiff legal fees consume
about the same proportion of the premium dollar9" and plaintiff fees are
not significantly greater than defendant fees.99
The last class created is between the injured and the seriously in-
jured medical malpractice victim. The dissent found that the statute un-
duly burdens the more seriously injured malpractice victim because
lawyers have less incentive to pursue larger recoveries, since their fee is
only 10% of that additional recovery.l°° The dissent concluded that the
statute could not withstand any meaningful level of judicial scrutiny'0 1
and stated that "[b]y upholding section 6146, the majority [does] a grave
injustice to victims of medical malpractice in [California] and to well-




In a 4-3 decision, California became the third state 0 3 to judicially
validate whole-scale limitations on contingency fees in medical malprac-
tice claims.'°4 In upholding section 6146, the majority treated the statute
merely as a routine business regulation'0 5 and neglected any meaningful
first amendment analysis as a basis for strict judicial scrutiny. 0 6 The
court reposed great authority in a 1920 United States Supreme Court
case 10 7 and ignored major first amendment decisions rendered in the sub-
sequent 65 years. Since the California Supreme Court relied so exten-
sively on Calhoun, the facts of that case merit some discussion and will
reveal a problem with the majority's asserted support.
Mr. Massie retained attorney C.C. Calhoun to prosecute his claim
exert great financial pressure on plaintiffs to settle at a minimum or drop suits completely. Since
defense fees are paid directly by insurance companies, section 6146 could therefore operate to in-
crease premiums. Id. at 948, 695 P.2d at 182-83, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96.
98. Note, supra note 16, at 943 n.687 (1979).
99. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, Report of the Secretary's Commission on
Medical Malpractice, No(05) 73-89 (Jan. 16, 1973) (hereinafter cited as HEW Report).
100. The dissent addresses hypothetical situations which show that the marginal increase in at-
torney fees might not cover the expenses of going to trial. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 945-46, 695 P.2d at
180-81, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
101. Id. at 952, 695 P.2d at 185, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
102. Id. at 953, 695 P.2d at 186, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
103. Indiana and New Hampshire addressed the issue in 1980. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.
Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 829 (1980).
104. New Jersey appears to be the first to limit contingency fees in all negligence cases. Ameri-
can Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974).
105. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 926, 695 P.2d at 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
106. Id. 3d at 927 n.5, 695 P.2d at 167 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80 n.5.
107. Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170 (1920).
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against the United States for property taken by Federal forces during the
Civil War. In a written contract, Mr. Massie agreed to pay attorney Cal-
houn 50% of any recovery. 08 Through Calhoun's efforts, Congress en-
acted legislation which made appropriations for payment of 1,115 claims
arising out of the Civil War. 0 9 The legislation also provided that no
more than 20% could be paid to an agent or attorney for services ren-
dered in prosecuting the claim."l 0 Massie's claim was decided favorably,
and the Government issued two Treasury warrants, one for $380 (repre-
senting 20%) made payable to Calhoun and one for $1,520 made payable
to Massie. Calhoun pursued his claim against Massie for the remaining
30% all the way to the United States Supreme Court. The Court upheld
the decisions of the lower courts, stating that the money was paid and
received under the Act. Payment to Calhoun by the Treasury of 20%
could be made only under that Act. He could not take under the Act and
then repudiate its provisions."'
Unlike Calhoun, the legislation affecting Roa does not also fund the
payments which are made. Where the government appropriates money
to pay claims, it has clear authority to protect that fund from fraud and
imposition by controlling to some extent the conditions under which
those claims are made. 1' 2 But where the State of California has not es-
tablished a patient compensation fund, it is questionable whether the leg-
islature may regulate the distribution of recoveries from non-State funds.
The court's reliance on Calhoun is thus highly questionable, because sec-
tion 6146 which limits the contingency fee does not also finance the funds
to be paid.
Nonetheless, the court relies on Calhoun to support its reasoning
that because contingency fees have been regulated from time immemo-
rial, 113 legislative ceilings on attorney fees are not constitutionally sus-
pect or subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 114 In a footnote, the majority
rejects any first amendment arguments which would trigger strict judicial
scrutiny. 15 The majority fails to answer how individuals exercise their
first amendment right to petition without the resources to meet the costs
of legal representation necessary to pursue that right. Instead, the major-
ity insists that the right to obtain counsel is not infringed because the
108. Id. at 172.
109. Id. at 171, 176.
110. Id. at 172.
111. Id. at 177.
112. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Massey, 253 U.S. at 173.
113. Id. at 174.
114. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 927, 695 P.2d at 167, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
115. Id. at 927-28 n.5, 695 P.2d at 167-68 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81 n.5.
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statute only limits the amount of fees that may be paid. 1 6 By so doing,
the majority ignores post-Calhoun decisions which hold that not only are
litigants entitled to petition the courts under the first amendment to ob-
tain monetary damages,' 17 but that economic activity essential to the ef-
fective exercise of that first amendment right may be restricted only
where necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest.,
1 8
The ability to petition for a redress of grievances is among the most
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights." 19 It is also
recognized that the legal advocacy involved in such litigation is itself pro-
tected speech. 120 Although recovery of damages in medical malpractice
actions are a primary goal, such action is often the only way for society
to communicate to health care providers the need for improved medical
care.' 2 ' With important first amendment interests such as petition and
speech at stake, any restrictions on a plaintiff's financial ability to retain
legal counsel should be carefully scrutinized.
It is well-acknowledged that medical malpractice cases constitute
complex litigation. 22 It is therefore most important that qualified attor-
neys are available to represent victims. The right to be heard is of little
avail if it does not encompass the right to be heard by counsel.
123 If
attorney fees are limited in medical malpractice cases, a problem in re-
taining counsel may arise.
Limitations on attorney fees are likely to produce a basic economic
result. There is a direct relation between prices and supply. As prices
increase, the supply increases. However, as prices decrease, supply also
decreases. If by decreasing prices section 6146 decreases the supply of
qualified attorneys to litigate complex medical malpractice claims, the
statute effectively denies the victim a right to redress.
116. Id. at 926, 695 P.2d at 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
117. See, e.g., Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n., 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967); Railroad Trainmen
v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527, 645 P.2d 137, 183
Cal. Rptr. 86 (1982); Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405
(1976).
118. Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984); Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
15-23, 57 (1976).
119. United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967); see also California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S.
576, 585-86 (1971).
120. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 437 (1963) (petitioner sought broad change in social
policy); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945) (petitioner sought damages for personal injury).
121. See Spence and Roth, supra note 7, at 309.
122. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 938, 695 P.2d at 174, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 87. See also Carpenter, supra
note 1, at 22; Keene, supra note 7, at 29-30; and Moore and O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical Mal-
practice Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1984).
123. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
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The majority fails to answer how a medical malpractice victim will,
in practice, be able to retain counsel at the reduced compensation under
section 6146. It also fails to provide any assurance that attorneys will
not abandon malpractice claims for other tort actions where compensa-
tion is not regulated. Instead, the majority seems to blame the plaintiffs
for failing to produce factual data showing that victims will, in fact, be
unable to retain counsel 124 and showing that attorneys are or will aban-
don malpractice claims. 125 Not only is such data difficult to obtain dur-
ing the pendency of an appeal, but more importantly, it is impossible to
predict today how many victims will be adversely affected by this statute
in the future. Consequently, the majority placed an onerous burden on
the plaintiffs.
The California court viewed section 6146 merely as a limitation on
fees and not as a restriction or complete bar to retain counsel.,2 6 Yet, if
filing a medical malpractice action constitutes speech, restrictions which
limit the quantity of spending devoted to protected expression are uncon-
stitutional.127 In Buckley v. Valeo, the legislative purpose was to reduce
skyrocketing costs of political campaigns 128 and to prevent corruption
and the appearance of corruption.1 29 In light of these purposes, the
Supreme Court held that limitations on donations to political candidates
was constitutional. However, those purposes were not sufficient to justify
restrictions on expenditures by a political candidate.130 Not only did the
expenditure restriction fail to serve any governmental interest, it heavily
burdened first amendment expression.
131
The concept that government may restrict the speech of some in
124. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 928, 695 P.2d at 168, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
125. Id. at 929-30, 695 P.2d at 169-70, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
126. Id. at 925-26, 695 P.2d at 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
127. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1975). In Buckley, the Court invalidated a statute
which limited how much political candidates could spend in their campaigns. The legislation passed
by Congress in 1971, and amended in 1974, concerned elections of the President, Vice-President, and
members of Congress. Summarized in broad terms, the statute provided that individual political
contributions are limited to $1,000 to any single candidate per election, with an overall annual limi-
tation of $25,000 by any contributor; independent expenditures by individual and groups "relative to
a clearly identified candidate" are limited to $1,000 a year; campaign spending by candidates for
various federal offices and spending for national conventions by political parties are subject to pre-
scribed limits. Id. at 1, 7. The Court found that the provisions limiting political contributions were
constitutionally valid. The limitations on expenditures, however, placed substantial and direct re-
strictions on the ability of candidates, citizens and associations to engage in protected political ex-
pressions, restrictions that the first amendment cannot tolerate. Id. at 58-59. Consequently, the
Court held the restrictions on expenditures unconstitutional.
128. Id. at 57.
129. Id. at 25-26.
130. Id. at 45.
131. Id. at 47-48.
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order to enhance the relative voice of others 132 is wholly foreign to the
first amendment. The amendment was designed to secure the widest pos-
sible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,
and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people. 133 The first amend-
ment's protection against governmental abridgment of free expression
cannot properly be made to depend on a person's financial ability to en-
gage in public discussion. 134
In light of an important first amendment right, the majority should
have applied strict scrutiny. Not only does the limitation select, 35 which
views are heard, it also violates the ban on content-based discrimina-
tion. 136 Section 6146 facially discriminates against the victim prosecut-
ing the claim, while the defendant retains his right to pay any amount
consistent with general law. 137 The majority failed to reconcile how the
right to petition is protected in our adversary system when plaintiffs are
intentionally prevented from paying fees comparable to their opponent's.
Instead, the majority justified this intentional limitation by saying, essen-
tially, that some recovery is better than no recovery.
138
The majority analogized the limitation on contingency fees to the
complete ban on contingency fees being paid to lobbyists. This analogy is
severely flawed. First, lobbyists do not usually work to recover a sum of
money, a percentage of which is then paid to them. Second, and more
significantly, the ban on contingency fees for lobbyists applies to repre-
sentatives of all viewpoints. It therefore does not select or favor which
views may be heard. Section 6146, on the other hand, does not apply to
all parties in a medical malpractice claim. It therefore indeed selects the
views which are ultimately heard.
But reducing attorney fees may not be necessary to meet the goal of
reducing malpractice premiums. 139 The attorney fee is paid out of the
plaintiffs recovery. Section 6146 serves only to reapportion that recov-
132. An ancillary interest underlying the Act was to mute the voices of affluent persons and
groups in the election process and thereby equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect the
outcome of elections. Id. at 25-26.
133. Id. at 48-49.
134. Id. at 49. Cf Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors, 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961).
135. See supra note 46; Environmental Planning & Information Council v. Superior Court, 36
Cal. 3d 188, 680 P.2d 1086, 203 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1984).
136. Some commentators suggest that strict scrutiny should apply even to facially neutral stat-
utes which restrict content. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AT 591-94
(1978); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST at 111-15 (1980).
137. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 940, 695 P.2d at 177, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 90 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 930, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
139. Id. at 941, 695 P.2d at 178, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 91 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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ery between the plaintiff and his attorney. It does not affect the total
amount paid by the insurance company. Only if attorney fees are a sig-
nificant factor in deciding whether to accept a settlement will section
6146 operate to reduce premiums. 140 Although the intended reduction in
premiums may not necessarily follow, section 6146 is probably valid
under a rational basis standard.
Yet, there may be less restrictive means to reduce premiums and
frivolous suits. Premiums cannot constitutionally be reduced by prevent-
ing meritorious claims from being filed.1 41 Frivolous suits can be appro-
priately screened by medical review panels.' 42  Even if a frivolous suit
should slip through, physicians may seek damages through malicious
prosecution actions. Many states have reduced the physician's burden in
obtaining recovery by eliminating the burden to prove special dam-
ages. 143 Other provisions, such as requiring a doctor's report to be ap-
pended to the complaint, accomplish the goals of reducing premiums and
frivolous suits without interfering with the victim's ability to obtain legal
representation at the generally accepted rate.
The right to petition under the first amendment implies by necessity
the right to obtain counsel in pursuing that claim. The California
Supreme Court refused to accept that the limitation on contingency fees
would abrogate any first amendment right. By refusing to apply strict
scrutiny, the majority validated the right of health care providers to
spend freely for their defense at the expense of their victims.
Due Process
Substantive due process requires that legislation be reasonable and
proper, not arbitrary and oppressive.'t 4 Some statutes limiting attorney
fees have been held constitutional. Legislation regulating workers' com-
pensation claims, probate fees, and Federal Tort Claims 145 at first glance,
140. Under professional standards of ethics, however, the client decides whether to accept or
reject a settlement.
141. Most medical malpractice reform acts include a provision requiring the case to first be
heard by a medical review panel. In Illinois, for example, the panel consists of three members:
judge, physician, and lawyer, who conduct a full trial. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 2-1012-2-1020
(1985). In Indiana, the panel consists of one attorney and three health care providers, and is more of
a review of records and documentation than a full trial. IND. CODE §§ 16-9.5-9.3, 16-9.5-9.4 (1982).
See also supra note 8.
142. Illinois eliminated the physician's burden to plead and prove special injury in a malicious
prosecution action. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-614 (1985).
143. Hale v. Morgan, 22 Cal. 3d 388, 584 P.2d 512, 149 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1978).
144. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (1979).
145. Current provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act are found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402,
1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671, 2672, 2674-80 (1983). Before enactment of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the government enjoyed immunity from such litigation. The Act gave a general
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
appear to support the majority. However, a more discerning analysis
reveals vast differences between those statutes and MICRA. First,
although fees are regulated by statute in workers' compensation claims,
there is quid pro quo, in that injured employees are not required to prove
negligence. 146 Thus, in exchange for statutory compensation and attor-
ney fees, employees benefit from a lower standard of proof. Accordingly,
the risk of zero recovery is also reduced. No such reciprocity is provided
in MICRA. 47 The medical malpractice victim must still meet the diffi-
cult burden of proving negligence. This often results in the battle of ex-
perts, assuming the plaintiff can retain one.
Probate statutes are also inapposite. These statutes provide that the
attorney be compensated for the actual work performed.148 MICRA does
not guarantee that the victim's attorney will be compensated for at least
the hours worked in the event of a recovery. Nor is there any provision
to adjust the statutory limitation if the fee proves to be inadequate for the
services performed.
14 9
The limitation in Federal Tort Claims also fails to support the ma-
jority's position. Under sovereign immunity, the government can com-
pletely prohibit tort actions against itself. In exchange for the ability to
sue the government in tort, certain limitations, including those on attor-
ney fees, are imposed. The tort victim receives something in exchange,
even though limits are imposed. 150 MICRA not only imposes limitations
on fees, but the victim has the same awesome burden of proof. More-
consent of the government to be sued in tort, though the consent was subject to several particular
restrictions. First, jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the federal district court. Second, consent to
the suit is limited to provide consent for non-jury trials only. Third, within two years after the claim
arises, it must be presented in writing to the administrative agency whose conduct is deemed respon-
sible for the damages. If the agency denies the claim, the action must be filed within six months. W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON TORTS at 1032-35 (5th ed. 1984).
146. None of the medical malpractice acts enacted to date lessen the victim's burden of proof.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, however, prohibits abrogation of a common
law right to sue in tort unless an adequate substitute remedy is provided. The "adequate substitute
remedy test" is derived from dictum in New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). See
also Spence and Roth, supra note 7, at 300.
147. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 942-44, 695 P.2d at 179-81, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 91-93 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
148. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4903 (1979).
149. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 944, 695 P.2d at 180, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 93. Illinois provides that the
court may review contingent fee agreements for fairness. In special circumstances where an attorney
performs extraordinary services involving more than usual participation in time and effort, the attor-
ney may apply to the court for approval of additional compensation. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-
114(c) (1985). New Jersey appears to have such a provision. See Donaghy v. Napoleon, 543 F.
Supp. 112, 115 (D.N.J. 1982).
150. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 944, 695 P.2d at 180, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 93. Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, a victim received the right to sue the government, which before the Act enjoyed sover-
eign immunity. See also supra note 145.
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over, it imposes an unfair disadvantage on one party in a legal dispute.' 5 '
The majority upholds legislation which gives all to the medical pro-
vider and drastically takes away from the victim, to the point of depriv-
ing him of needed legal representation to pursue a potentially
sophisticated claim. MICRA thus proves to be arbitrary and oppressive,




Section 6146 creates three basic classes: (1) medical malpractice vic-
tims vs. other tort victims; (2) wealthy victims vs. victims without finan-
cial resources; and (3) plaintiff attorneys vs. defendant attorneys. Under
California law, the statute must bear a substantial and rational relation to
a legitimate state purpose in order to pass an equal protection chal-
lenge. 153 From a very narrow perspective, the majority's view seems rea-
sonable. The limitation presumably protects the pre-diminished
compensation of a victim, and a reduced fee will certainly deter the filing
of lawsuits. To the extent that a statute limits or eliminates one's right to
receive compensation for injuries, there is a logical and equal reduction
in the need for the insurance protection, which has traditionally provided
the source for these compensation payments.154
A more realistic view, however, is Chief Justice Bird's dissent.
Although ensuring that medical malpractice victims receive the bulk of
any recovery is a legitimate state interest, there is no reason to distin-
guish them from other tort victims. 55 Additionally, it is ironic that the
151. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 944, 695 P.2d at 180, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
152. Id. at 944, 948, 695 P.2d at 180, 183, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 93, 96.
153. Id. at 950, 695 P.2d at 185, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 98; see Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506
P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (automobile guest statute held unconstitutional because classifi-
cations created did not bear a substantial and rational relation to statute's purpose). See also Aitken,
supra note 1, at 91.
154. See Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 951, 695 P.2d at 185, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
155. In the event of a crisis, however, there might be a rational basis to distinguish medical
malpractice plaintiffs from other tort plaintiffs. If drastic increases in insurance premiums resulted
in a threat to the continuing availability of health care, the interests of the public and the interests of
malpractice victims would need to be balanced. Some commentators believe such a crisis actually
occurred. See Carpenter, supra note 1; Keith, supra note 8; and Moore and O'Connell, supra note
122. Others strongly refute that a crisis ever existed. See Aitken, supra note 1; Bartimus, Protecting
Plaintiffs Rights in the Medical Malpractice "Crisis," 53 UMKC L. REv. 1 (1984); Keith, supra note
4; Sepler, supra note 7; and Spence and Roth, supra note 7. See also Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine,
97 Idaho 859, 872, 555 P.2d 399, 412 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977)("[i]t is argued that the
Act is a necessary legislative response to a 'crisis in medical malpractice insurance' in Idaho, but the
record does not demonstrate any such 'crisis' "). According to Spence and Roth, the only "crisis" is
that health care providers must absorb higher operating costs [i.e., higher insurance premiums] to
insure themselves against their own negligent conduct. Thus, the only certain effect of medical mal-
practice legislation is that health care providers will be insulated from the financial burden tradition-
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statute deprives a victim of full compensation with one provision and
then makes a seemingly noble gesture to "protect" that recovery by
prohibiting the victim from paying the market rate for legal representa-
tion. The majority ignores the fact that the victim may not even be able
to obtain an attorney at the reduced fee.
156
With respect to the second classification, wealthy 15 7 plaintiffs who
can afford to pay a retainer are not prohibited from doing so under sec-
tion 6146. Thus, a victim with financial resources is in a position to com-
pensate the attorney for at least the hours worked. As is more often the
case, however, a medical malpractice victim has already expended large
sums in seeking medical treatment, and a request for a retainer becomes
an insurmountable block. Consequently, the victim without financial re-
sources may be prohibited from pursuing a claim, in contrast to a wealth-
ier plaintiff who could subsidize the fee authorized by statute.
A third problem is the classification created between plaintiff attor-
neys and defendant attorneys. Although victims are prohibited from
paying the market rate for legal representation, a medical provider may
spend freely for his defense. The majority did not see this as an inequity
in our adversarial system. Instead, it justified the classification on the
basis that the limitation on contingency fees is rationally related to re-
ducing malpractice premiums. The majority ignored documentation
showing that defense fees consume the same percentage of premiums as
do plaintiff fees. 158 Moreover, defense fees are paid directly out of insur-
ance funds in contrast to plaintiff fees which are deducted from the total
recovery. It is therefore questionable whether section 6146 is really ra-
tionally related to reducing premiums.
CONCLUSION
The limitations on attorney fees proscribed by section 6146 seriously
abridge first amendment rights. By limiting contingency fees, the statute
limits the number of qualified attorneys willing to petition on behalf of
medical malpractice victims. Without a qualified attorney, a malpractice
ally associated with negligence. Spence and Roth, supra note 7, at 285, 296, 305. Another
commentator, Dr. Sepler, used extensive data and graphs and concluded that while the probability of
court action against the average physician has increased, malpractice litigation has not affected
(1) the total civil caseload (2) physicians' fees, (3) hospital costs, (4) total medical care expenses, or
(5) the total number of physicians licensed annually. Sepler, supra note 7, at 506.
156. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 933, 695 P.2d at 172, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
157. California law establishes wealth as a suspect class. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601 (1971), cert. denied 432 U.S. 907.
158. HEW Report, supra note 99, at 33.
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victim's right to petition for redress is a nullity. Insofar as lawsuits con-
stitute speech, restrictions which limit spending devoted to protected ex-
pression are unconstitutional. The first amendment protects against
government abridging free expression based on one's financial ability.
Contrary to this protection, section 6146 restricts the amount spent by
victims while health care providers may spend freely in their defense. As
a result, it imposes an unfair disadvantage on victims in medical mal-
practice claims. Such a disadvantage runs afoul of our adversary system
where the scales of justice are supposedly balanced at the outset.

